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Abstract
We consider (cooperative) linear production games with a con-
tinuum of players. The coalitional function is generated by r + 1
“production factors” that is, non atomic measures defined on an
interval. r of these are orthogonal probabilities which, econom-
ically, can be considered as “cornered” production factors. The
r+1th measure involved has positive mass “across the carriers” of
the orthogonal probabilities. That is, there is a “non–cornered”
(or “central”) production factor available throughout the market.
We consider convex vNM–Stable Sets of this game. Depending
on the size of the central measure, we observe cases in which a
vNM–Stable Set is uniquely defined to be either the core or the
convex hull of the core plus a unique additional imputation. We
observe other situations in which a variety of vNM–Stable Sets
exists.
Within this first part we will present the coalitions that are
necessary and sufficient for dominance relations between impu-
tations. In the context of the “purely orthogonal” production
game this question is answered in a rather straightforward way by
the “Inheritance Theorem” established in [3]. However, once or-
thogonality is abandoned one has to establish prerequisites about
ε–relevant coalitions. Thus, this first part centers around the for-
mulation of a generalized “Inheritance Theorem”.
As a consequence, based on the Inheritance Theorem, we pro-
vide conditions for the core to be a vNM–Stable Set whenever
the central commodity is available in abundance.
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1 Introduction
The main theorem in [3]and [4] is the Characterization Theorem for convex
vNM–Stable Sets of non–atomic orthogonal linear production games with a
continuum of players. This theorem states that every vNM–Stable Set is
standard, that is, generated as the convex hull of finitely many probabili-
ties that are absolutely continuous to the factor distributions of the market
respectively.
Within this paper we start out to discuss a non–orthogonal linear production
game. We describe vNM–stable sets for this game that – in addition to a set
of orthogonal measures – admits of a further measure “across” the carriers.
Thus, apart from several separate sectors of a market (“corners”) providing a
unique factor, production is also enabled by a distribution that is available
in all sectors.
Rudimentary, this kind of game appears in Holzman, Monderer, Einy,
and Shitovitz, see [2]. They provide an example with a measure which has
mass accumulated across the carriers of two orthogonal probabilities. Here,
the third factor appears in such quantities that the core still provides the
unique vNM–Stable Set.
After a change of some quantities the core fails to dominate all imputations
outside. Then there appears a (sometimes unique) vNM–Stable set contain-
ing the core. We provide a description of the EHMS–example in Section 3
as well as in a subsequent paper regarding this topic.
The aim of the present paper is, however, the discussion of the general “Semi
Orthogonal Game” and in particular, its “ε–relevant coalitions”. By contrast
we refer to the model discussed in [3] and [4] as to the “Purely Orthogonal
Game”. Within this paper we provide the appropriate generalization of the
Inheritance Theorem of [3].
2 Notations and Definitions
We start by collecting some definitions and notations necessary for our pre-
sentation. We follow the conventions used in [3] and [4].
The general background is given by a (cooperative) game with a continuum
of players, i.e., is a triple (I,F, v) such that I is some interval in the reals
(the players), F is the σ−field of (Borel) measurable sets (the coalitions)
and v (the coalitional function) is a mapping v : F → R+ which is
absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure λ. We focus on “linear
production games”, that is, v is described by finitely many measures λρ, (ρ ∈
{0, 1, . . . , r}) via
(2.1) v(S) := min {λρ(S) | ρ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r } (S ∈ F).
We write R := {1, . . . , r} and R0 := {0, 1, . . . , r} = R ∪ {0}. Also, we
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use
∧
to denote the min operation implied by (2.1) in the lattice of set
functions on F. Then (2.1) is equivalent to
(2.2) v =
∧{
λ0,λ1, . . . ,λr
}
=
∧
ρ∈R0
λρ.
The carrier of a measure µ is denoted by C(µ). As we consider measures
that are absolutely continuous w.r.t to Lebesgue measure λ, we use
•
µ to
denote the Radon–Nikodym density of µ w.r.t. λ . The assumption of an
underlying “reference measure” and existing densities for the members of a
vNM–Stable Set is justified in [3],[4]. As in these previous papers statements
referring to the reference measure are meant to hold true almost surely –
abbreviations like “a.s” or “a.e.” will generally be omitted.
We assume that the measures λ1, . . . ,λr are orthogonal probabilities. There
is no loss of generalization in assuming that they are copies of Lebesgue
measure. Thus we choose the player set to be I := [0, r). The carrier of
λρ is Cρ := [ρ − 1, ρ) (ρ ∈ R) such that λρ := λCρ . This way the λ
ρ are
orthogonal probabilities defined on I satisfying
⋃
ρ∈RC
ρ = I.
The measure λ0 is assumed to have a piecewise constant density
•
λ0 w.r.t λ.
To describe this density, we choose t ∈ N and, for ρ ∈ R, define Tρ := {(ρ−
1)t + 1, . . . , ρt} as well as T := ∪ρ∈R T
ρ). Next we choose a partition
{Dτ}τ∈Tρ of C
ρ such that
⋃
τ∈TρD
τ = Cρ and Dτ ∩Dτ
′
= ∅ (τ, τ ′ ∈ Tρ).
Finally we choose constants hτ ≥ 0 (τ ∈ T) such that the density
•
λ0 is given
by
(2.3)
•
λ0 = hτ on D
τ
, (τ ∈ T)
Introducing the indicator function 1Sof a set S we write (2.3) also as
(2.4)
•
λ0 =
∑
τ∈T
hτ 1Dτ ;
We write
(2.5) λτ := λ(D
τ ) (τ ∈ T), λ0τ := λ
0(Dτ ) (τ ∈ T),
and for any T′ ⊆ T
(2.6) λT′ = λ(∪τ∈T′Dτ ), λ
0
T′ = λ
0(∪τ∈T′Dτ )
such that
∑
τ∈Tρ λ
ρ
τ = 1 for ρ ∈ R holds true. The measure λ
0 is not assumed
to be a probability and it is carrying mass across the carriers of the λρ(ρ ∈ R).
More precisely, we assume
(2.7) λ0(I) =
∑
τ∈T
hτλt > 1 ,
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which implies that the core of v is given by
C(v) = {λρ ρ ∈ R} ,
see (Billera–Ranaan [1]).
Example 2.1. Figure 2.1 illustrates a situation for r = t = 2. We assume
(2.8) h1 = 0, h2, h3 < 1, h4 = 1 and h2λ2 + h3λ3 + λ4 > 1
λ1
λ0
λ0
λ2
D1 D2 D3 D4
h3
h2
Figure 2.1: The case of 4 steps: the density of λ0
◦ ˜˜˜˜˜˜ ◦
Our solution concept is given by the vNM–Stable Set . The version for
a finite player set has been introduced by von Neumann-Morgenstern
[5]. Let us repeat the definitions for a continuum of players which is the
appropriate one for the present context.
Definition 2.2. Let (I,F, v) be a game. An imputation is a measure ξ
with ξ(I) = v(I). An imputation ξ dominates an imputation η w.r.t S ∈ F
if ξ is effective for S, i.e.,
(2.9) λ(S) > 0 and ξ(S) ≤ v(S)
and if
(2.10) ξ(T ) > η(T ) (T ∈ F, T ⊆ S,λ(T ) > 0)
holds true. That is, every subcoalition of S (almost every player in S ) strictly
improves its payoff at ξ versus η. We write ξ domS η to indicate domination.
It is standard to use ξ domη whenever ξ domS η holds true for some coalition
S ∈ F.
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We allow domination also to take place between “subimputations”, i.e., mea-
sures with total mass less than v(I).
Definition 2.3. Let v be a game. A set S of imputations is called a vNM–
Stable Set if
• there is no pair ξ,µ ∈ S such that ξ domµ holds true ( “internal sta-
bility”).
• for every imputation η /∈ S there exists ξ ∈ S such that ξ domη is
satisfied ( “external stability”).
The discrete nature of the density of λ0 carries some implications for the
establishment of dominance based on discrete analogues of concepts like im-
putations, coalitions etc. We refer to these analogues as “pre–concepts”. E.g.,
the “discrete” analogues to imputations are vectors x ∈ R
|T|
+ = R
rt
+ as follows.
Definition 2.4. The set
(2.11) J :=
{
x = (xτ )τ∈T ∈ R
rt
+
∑
τ∈T
λτxτ = 1
}
is called the set of pre–imputations. For any x ∈ J the measure ϑx defined
by the density
(2.12)
•
ϑx :=
∑
τ∈T
xτ1Dτ ,
clearly constitutes a (“piecewise constant”, “step function”) imputation ϑx ∈
I(v).
Next, a pre–coalition is a nonnegative vector a = (aτ )τ∈T ∈ R
rt
+ . Such
a vector may serve as a “discrete” analogue to coalitions (or rather to the
Lebesgue measure of coalitions). More precisely, let
→
λ be the vector–valued
measure defined by
(2.13)
→
λ(⋆) = {λ(⋆ ∩Dτ )}τ∈T
Then for some T ∈ F the vector
(2.14) a = (aτ )τ∈T := {λ(T ∩D
τ )}τ∈T =
→
λ(T )
reflects the coalition T properly. In particular, for ε > 0 and some vector
a ∈ Rrt+ , a coalition T
εa satisfying λ(T εa ∩Dτ ) = εaτ (τ ∈ T) yields the
vector valued measure
→
λ evaluated at T εh via
(2.15)
→
λ(T εh) = εa .
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Consequently, we also introduce the concept of pre–measures ,which are
functionals on pre–coalitions, hence in the discrete context, vectors as well.
Generally, a vector c ∈ Rrt+ when seen as a density constant on the D
τ , gives
rise to an (absolutely continuous) measure µ on F via
(2.16)
•
µ :=
∑
τ∈T
cτ1Dτ or µ(⋆) :=
∑
τ∈T
cτλ(⋆ ∩D
τ ) .
Then, for some pre–coalition a and a coalition T = T a as in (2.14) above we
have
µ(T a) =
∑
τ∈T
cτλ(T
a ∩Dτ ) =
∑
τ∈T
cτaτ = ca = c(a) ;
thus the linear functional on pre–coalitions
(2.17) c : Rrt → R , c(a) :=
∑
τ∈T
cτaτ .
reflects the action of the measure µ on coalitions.
Specifically the vector
e0 := (ht)τ∈T
reflecting the density of λ0, corresponds to the functional
(2.18) c0 : Rrt → R , cρ(a) :=
∑
τ∈T
hτaτ
such that for some T a as above we have
λ0(T a) = c0(a) = e0a .
Also, we introduce the vector
eT
ρ
= 1Tρ(•) ∈ R
rt
+ (ρ ∈ R) .
by
(2.19) eT
ρ
τ =
{
1 τ ∈ Tρ
0 otherwise
}
.
This vector can be interpreted in three ways:
First of all eT
ρ
reflects the density of λρ w.r.t. to Lebesgue measure, i.e.,
(2.20)
•
λρ(⋆) = 1Cρ(⋆) =
∑
τ∈Tρ
1D
τ (⋆) =
∑
τ∈T
eT
ρ
τ 1D
τ (⋆)
and for T = T a as above
(2.21) λρ(T ) = λ(Cρ ∩ T ) =
∑
τ∈Tρ
λ(Dτ ∩ T ) =
∑
τ∈T
eT
ρ
τ λ(D
τ ∩ T ) = eT
ρ
a
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Thus, if eT
ρ
is seen as the linear functional
(2.22) cρ : Rrt → R , cρ(a) :=
∑
τ∈T
e
Tρ
τ aτ =
∑
τ∈Tρ
aτ .
Then, for a pre–coalition a, and T a as above, we have
λρ(T a) =
∑
τ∈Tρ
λ(T a ∩Dτ ) =
∑
τ∈Tρ
aτ = c
ρ(a) = eT
ρ
a ;
that is, eT
ρ
or the pre–measure cρ correspond to λρ.
Secondly note that eT
ρ
∈ J constitutes a pre–imputation. The imputation
generated by x = eT
ρ
is of course ϑx = λρ which plays a double role as an
imputation as well as a measure or linear function on coalitions.
Finally, the vector a = 1Tρ(•) corresponds to the coalition T
a = Cρ.
Next we introduce the discrete version of the coalitional function v which is
the pre–game v. For any pre–coalition a ∈ Rrt we define
(2.23) v(a) := min {cρ (ρ ∈ R0) }
Note that v is a positively homogenous function, i.e., v(ta) = tv(a) for any
positive real t. The connection to v is of course
εv(a) = v(εa) = v(T εa)
for ε > 0,a ∈ Rrt+ and T
εa as above.
Finally, the convex hull
C(v) := ConvH
{
eT
ρ}
ρ∈R
⊆ J
is called the pre–core and the core of the game satisfies
C(v) = ConvH{λρ}ρ∈R = {ϑ
x x ∈ C(v)} .
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3 ε–Relevant Coalitions
We shall now exhibit a set of coalitions that will predominantly be effec-
tive for domination. In the “purely” orthogonal case as treated in [3]and [4]
(i.e., when there is no measure λ0 with carrier across the carriers Cρ) the
“Inheritance Theorem” states that it is necessary and sufficient to restrict
all considerations regarding domination on coalitions that yield a vector–
valued measure
→
λ(T ) = (ε, . . . , ε). In the present semi–orthogonal case the
situation is more involved. Yet, we can demonstrate that domination is gov-
erned by an essentially finite family of coalitions. As previously we write
R0 := R ∪ {0} = {0, . . . , r}.
Definition 3.1. 1. Let
(3.1) A :
{
a ∈ Rrt+ c
ρ(a) ≥ 1 (ρ ∈ R0)
}
Then A is a convex set. The extremal points of A are called the rele-
vant vectors; Ae denotes the set of these extremal points.
2. For ε > 0 a coalition T is called ε–relevant if there is a relevant
vector a ∈ Ae such that
→
λ(T ) = εa. We shall also use the term
ε–a–relevant coalition if a has been exhibited.
Recall the vector valued measure
→
λ for some coalition T a such that
(3.2) a =
→
λ(T a) := (λ(T a ∩Dτ ))τ∈T .
Now, for some coalition T = T a with
v(T ) = min{λρ(T ) ρ ∈ R0} = min{c
ρ(a) ρ ∈ R0} = v(a),
we obtain that
a0 :=
a
v(a)
=
→
λ(T )
v(T )
∈ A, v(a0) =
1
v(a)
v(a) = 1,
thus, a0 is located in the boundary of A.
We may emulate the “purely” orthogonal case (i.e., when λ0 is missing) by
choosing all Tρ = {r} to be single valued in which case it is easy to see
that (1, . . . , 1) is the only extremal of A. Then the Inheritance Theorem
mentioned above shows any coalition S with positive value contains an ε–
relevant coalition T with
→
λ(T ) = (ε, . . . , ε) such that dominance is inherited.
The following Lemma, while of a purely geometric nature, indicates that
eventually we will be able to imitate the above consideration within our
present context.
Lemma 3.2. For any â ∈ A there exists a¯ ∈ A such that
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1. a¯ ≤ â
2. There is a set E ⊆ Ae, say
E =
{
a(k) k ∈ K
}
⊆ Ae with K := {1, . . . , K}
of relevant vectors as well as a set of “convex” (i.e., nonnegative and
summing up to one) coefficients {γk}k∈K such that
(3.3) a¯ =
∑
k∈K
γka
(k)
holds true.
3. If min{cρâ ρ ∈ R0} = 1, then there is some ρ ∈ R0 such that for
k ∈K
cρâ = cρa¯ = cρa(k) = 1
holds true.
a
â
a a(2)
a(1)
Figure 3.1: The shape of A
Proof: Essentially one has to decrease coordinates of â until a compact
boundary facet of A is reached. Then the vector obtained is a “convex
combination” of vectors in Ae by the Krein–Milman Theorem.
1
st
STEP :
Given â, let R1 := {ρ ∈ R0 c
ρâ = 1} and put
I0 := {τ âτ > 0}, I+ := {τ c
ρ
τ > 0 for at least one ρ ∈ R1}
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(I+ = ∅ for R1 = ∅). Assume that I0 ∩ I
c
+ 6= ∅ is the case. Pick some
τ ∈ I0 ∩ I
c
+. Then âτ > 0 and c
ρ
τ = 0 for all ρ ∈ R1. Consider for t ≥ 0
â
t := â− teτ .
Clearly, âtcρ ≥ 1 for all t ≥ 0 and ρ ∈ R1. Therefore there is t0 > 0 such
that a0 := at0 ∈ A and either a0τ = 0 for some τ ∈ Î or else c
ρa0 = 1 for
some ρ /∈ R1. In other words, t0 is the first t such that an additional equation
from the inequalities defining A prevails. Replacing â by a0 and defining
Î and I+ accordingly, we have diminished I0 ∩ I
c
+ by at least one element.
Clearly a0 ≤ â. Proceeding this way, we find, therefore, a¯ ≤ â such that
(with appropriate redefinitions) I0 ∩ I
c
+ = ∅ holds true, that is I0 ⊆ I+ is
the case.
2
nd
STEP : Thus we have found a¯ ≤ â such that, for any τ with at > 0
there is some ρ satisfying cρτ > 0. Let
Â := A|RnI0
= A ∩ {a aτ = 0 (τ /∈ I0)}
For all a ∈ Â and for all τ with xτ > 0 there is ρ such that c
ρ
t > 0 and
c
ρa = 1. hence, Â is a compact convex polyhedron containing a¯. Let{
a(k)
}
k∈K
denote the extremal points of this set. Then there exists a set of
“convex” coefficients {γk}k∈K such that
a¯ =
∑
k∈K
γka
(k)
.
It is not hard to see that the vectors a(k) (k ∈ K) are extremals of A as well
as all coordinates vanish outside of I0. Hence our Lemma is verified. q.e.d.
We are now in the position to formulate the main result of this paper.
Theorem 3.3 (The Inheritance Theorem). Let ϑ,η be imputations and
let S be a coalition such that ϑ domS η. Then there is ε0 > 0 such that for all
0 < ε < ε0 there is a relevant vector a ∈ A
e and a coalition T = T a,ε ⊆ S
satisfying
→
λ(T ) = εa and ϑ domT η .
In other words, with respect to domination it is sufficient and necessary to
consider ε–relevant coalitions only.
Proof:
1
st
STEP :
Let a˜ :=
→
λ(S) and â :=
→
λ(S)
v(S)
= a˜
v(a˜)
such that v(â) = min {eρâ ρ ∈ R0}} =
1. Choose a¯ ≤ â according to Lemma 3.2, item 1 and ρ according to item
3. Next choose a coalition S¯⊆S such that
→
λ(S¯) = v(S)a¯ ≤ v(S)â .
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Then clearly
v(S¯) = min{λρ(S¯) ρ ∈ R0}
= min{cρ
→
λ(S¯) ρ ∈ R0}
= cρ
→
λ(S¯) = v(S)cρa¯ = v(S)
= v(S)cρâ = cρ
→
λ(S)
= min{cρ
→
λ(S) ρ ∈ R0}
= v(S) .
(3.4)
Now, as ϑ exceeds η strictly on S, it dominates η a fortiori on S¯⊆S, hence
we have
(3.5) ϑdomS¯ η
2
nd
STEP :
Let m be the ess inf of ϑ over S. Then
(3.6) mλ(S) ≤ v(S¯) = λρ(S¯)
Now, if we have an equation in (3.6), then necessarily ϑ = λρ on S¯. Then ϑ
cannot dominate as λρ equals 0 outside Cρ.
Hence we can find T¯⊆S¯ with positive measure such that, for all T 0⊆T¯
(3.7) ϑ(T 0) < λρ(T 0)
holds true. In particular, we can choose T 0⊆T¯ and δ0 > 0 such that for all
T
′⊆T 0
(3.8) ϑ(T ′) < λρ(T ′)
and
(3.9)
→
λ(T 0) = δ0a¯
holds true. This implies
(3.10) v(T 0) = λρ(T 0) =
→
λ(T 0)cρ = δ0cρa¯
and
(3.11) ϑ(T ′) < λρ(T ′) for all T ′⊆T 0
hence
(3.12) ϑ(T 0) < λρ(T 0) = v(T 0) .
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Moreover, according to the second item of Lemma 3.2, we can find a set of
extremals
E =
{
a(k) k ∈ K
}
and coefficients {γk}k∈K satisfying
(3.13) a¯ =
∑
k∈K
γka
(k)
.
3
rd
STEP : Now choose ε0 > 0 such that for all 0 < ε < ε0 and all k ∈ K
there exists a coalition T ⋆(k)⊆T 0 such that
(3.14)
→
λ(T ⋆(k)) = εa(
k)
and all the T ⋆(k) are mutually disjoint. Then, considering the (|T| + 1) =
(rt+ 1) dimensional vector valued measure (
→
λ,ϑ), choose for every k ∈ K a
coalition T (k)⊆T ⋆(k) satisfying
(3.15)
(
→
λ(T (k))),ϑ(T (k)) = γk(
→
λ(T ⋆(k)),ϑ(T ⋆(k))) = (εγka
(k)
, εγkϑ(T
⋆(k))) .
Then
v(T (k)) = cρ
→
λ(T (k)) = εγkc
ρa(k) .
Define T ⋆ :=
⋃
k=1,...,K T
⋆(k). Because of T ⋆⊆T 0 we have
ϑ(T ⋆) < v(T ⋆) .
Moreover,
∑
k∈K
γkϑ(T
(k)) =
∑
k∈K
ϑ(T ⋆(k)) = ϑ(T ⋆) < v(T ⋆)
= min{cρ
→
λ(T ⋆) ρ ∈ R1} ≤ c
ρ
→
λ(T ⋆)
= cρ
∑
k∈K
→
λ(T ⋆k) =
∑
k∈K
cρ
→
λ(T ⋆k)
=
∑
k∈K
cργk
→
λ(T k) =
∑
k∈K
γkc
ρ
→
λ(T k)
=
∑
k∈K
γkv(T
k) .
(3.16)
Hence ϑ(T (k)) < v(T k) for at least one k ∈ K. However, ϑ strictly exceeds
η on T (k)⊆S, hence we have ϑ dom
T (
k) η.
In view of (3.14) and (3.15) we see that T (k) is an εγk relevant coalition and
because of
T
(k) ⊆ T ⋆(k) ⊆ T 0 ⊆ T ⊆ S ⊆ S
the proof is complete. q.e.d.
We proceed by describing the generic shape of the relevant vectors.
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Lemma 3.4. Let a¯ ∈ Ae be a relevant vector, i.e., an extremal vector of A.
Then a¯ has at most r + 1 and at least r positive coordinates.
Proof: If a¯ is extremal, then there have to be rt equations among the
defining inequalities of A that a¯ has to satisfy. As there are r + 1 linear
functionals only, there have to be at least rt− (r + 1) equations of the form
xτ = 0 that a¯ satisfies as well. Hence there are at most r + 1 positive
coordinates of a¯. Now, if there are less than r positive coordinates of a¯, then
in at least one T ρ there is no positive coordinate, hence cρ(a¯) = eT
ρ
a¯ = 0,
contradicting a¯ ∈ A.
q.e.d.
Theorem 3.5. Let a ∈ Rrt+ and let τ¯ ∈ T
1 × . . . × Tr be a sequence such
that a is described by one of the following alternatives. Then a is relevant.
If h > 0, then all relevant vectors are obtained this way.
1. Let
(3.17)
∑
ρ∈R
hτρ ≥ 1 .
Then a⊙ ∈ A defined via
(3.18) a⊙τ¯ρ = 1 (ρ ∈ R) and a
⊙
τ = 0 whenever τ /∈ {τ 1, . . . , τ r} ,
i.e.,
a⊙ = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0 . . . , 0, 1, 0, , . . . , , . . . , 0, 1, 0 . . . , 0) .
constitutes a relevant vector. Clearly a⊙ satisfies
1 = v(a⊙) = eT
ρ
a⊙ ≤ c0(a⊙) (ρ ∈ R) .
2. Let hτρ > 0 (ρ ∈ R) and let
(3.19)
∑
ρ∈R
hτρ < 1 ,
then the vector a⊕ given by
a
⊕
τρ = 1 (ρ ∈ R \ {r})
a
⊕
τr =
1− (hτ1 + . . .+ hτ r−1)
hτr
> 1,
a
⊕
τ = 0 otherwise ,
(3.20)
i.e.,
a⊕ = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0 . . . , 0, 1, 0, , . . . , 0,
1− (hτ1 + . . .+ hτr−1)
hτr
, 0, . . . , 0) .
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yields a relevant vector. Clearly a⊕ satisfies
1 = v(a⊕) = eT
ρ
a⊕ = c0(a⊕) ≤ eT
r
a⊕ (ρ = 1, . . . , r − 1) .
An analogous constructions is obtained by replacing r by any σ ∈
{1, . . . , r}. This yields a relevant vector of the shape
a
⊕
τρ = 1 (ρ ∈ R \ {σ})
a
⊕
τσ =
1− (hτ1 + . . .+ hτσ−1 + hτσ+1 + . . .+ hτr)
hτσ
> 1,
a
⊕
τ = 0 otherwise ,
(3.21)
or
a⊕ = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0 . . . , 0,
1− (hτ1 + . . .+ hτσ−1 + hτσ+1 + . . .+ hτr)
hτσ
, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0 . . . , 0) .
3. Finally, as a third alternative assume that there exists τ r ∈ T
r in ad-
dition to the sequence τ¯ , such that and
(3.22)
∑
ρ∈R
hτρ < 1 <
∑
ρ∈R\{r}
hτρ + hτr
(implying hτr > hτr). Then the vector a
⊖ defined by
a
⊖
τρ = 1 (ρ ∈ R \ {r})
a
⊖
τr =
1− (hτ1 + . . .+ hτ r)
hτr
− hτr
,
a
⊖
τr
=
(hτ1 + . . .+ hτr−1 + hτr)− 1
hτr
− hτr
,
a
⊖
τ = 0 otherwise .
(3.23)
with
v(a⊖) = eT
ρ
a⊖ = c0(a⊖) = 1 (ρ ∈ R)
There is also the vector obtained via exchanging r by some σ:
a
⊖
τρ = 1 (ρ ∈ R \ {σ})
a
⊖
τσ =
1− (hτ1 + . . .+ hτr)
hτσ
− hτσ
,
a
⊖
τσ
=
(hτ1 + . . .+ hτr−1 + hτσ − hτσ)− 1
hτσ
− hτσ
,
a
⊖
τ = 0 otherwise .
(3.24)
Proof:
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1
st
STEP : The first situation occurs exactly whenever a⊙ satisfies the r
equations
eT
ρ
a⊙ = 1 (ρ = 1, . . . , r)
together with suitably many equations of the type aτ = 0. Also, c
0(a⊙) =∑
ρ∈R hτρ ≥ 1 shows that a
⊙ is indeed extremal in A, that is, a relevant
vector.
2
nd
STEP : In the second case the vector a⊕ is determined by r−1 equations
eT
ρ
a = 1 (ρ ∈ R \ {r}) and the equation c0a = 1. Moreover,
1− (hτ1 + . . .+ hτr−1)
hτr
≥ 1
implies eT
r
a⊕ ≥ 1.
Clearly, r can be exchanged with any σ ∈ {1, . . . , r} which results in possible
relevant vectors as described.
3
rd
STEP : This vector is seen to satisfy all the equations eT
ρ
a = 1 (ρ ∈ R)
as well as c0(a) = 1. Obviously again we have an extremal point of A.
q.e.d.
Remark 3.6. For computational purposes and in order to avoid rational
expressions of the relevant vectors in terms of the data hτ , we will sometimes
consider another normalization of relevant vectors.
The first possibility described in item 1 by (3.17) obviously needs no renor-
malization. However, the type of relevant vector described within the second
item via (3.19) can be multiplied by hτr obtaining a “renormalized relevant
vector” of the shape
(3.25)
a⊕ = (0, . . . , 0, hτr , 0 . . . , 0, hτr , 0, . . . , 0, 1− (hτ1 + . . .+ hτ r−1), 0 . . . , 0) .
which yields
v(a⊕) = eT
ρ
a⊕ = c0(a⊕) = hτr ≤ e
T ra⊕ (ρ = 1, . . . , r − 1) .
Similarly, for item 3 as specified by (3.22) the alternative version involving
the hτ only in numerators is
a
⊖
τρ = hτr − hτr (ρ ∈ R \ {r})
a
⊖
τr = 1− (hτ1 + . . .+ hτr) ,
a
⊖
τr
= (hτ1 + . . .+ hτr−1 + hτr)− 1 ,
a
⊖
τ = 0 otherwise ,
(3.26)
(with a⊖τ̂r +a
⊖
τr
= hτ̂r−hτr). This version constitutes a “renormalized relevant
vector“ satisfying
v(a⊖) = eT
ρ
a⊖ = c0(a⊖) = hτ̂r − hτ r (ρ ∈ R) .
◦ ˜˜˜˜˜˜ ◦
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Example 3.7. Recall the 2 × 2 Example 2.1. Given the data as specified
in (2.8), observe that the vector a14 := (1, 0, 0, 1) is always relevant, i.e.,
extremal in A; we have
(3.27) v(a14) := min{cρa14 ρ ∈ R0} = e
12a14 = e34a14 = c0a14 = 1 .
Within this context, we call an ε–a14–relevant coalition T 14 = T 1 ∪ T 4 to
be ε–14–relevant if
→
λ(T 14) = εa14 holds true. In this case we have
v(T 14) = min{cρ
→
λ(T 14) ρ ∈ R0} = εmin{c
ρa14 ρ ∈ R0}
= λ1(T 14) = λ2(T 14) = λ3(T 14)
= ε .
Consider the case that h2+h3 ≤ 1 and λ1+λ3 ≤ 1 holds true. We label this
case “scarce central commodity” as λ0 is small, hence has more influence in
the formation of v. By contrast, a market with abundant central commodity
will be considered later on in Example 4.7 and Theorem 4.9.
Now it turns out that
a⊕23 := (0,
1− h3
h2
, 1, 0) and a⊕32 := (0, 1,
1− h2
h3
, 0)
are relevant vectors of the second type. Following Remark 3.6 we prefer to
normalize these vectors such that the rational expressions are avoided, that
is we consider
a23 := (0, 1− h3, h2, 0) and a
32 := (0, h3, 1− h2, 0) .
Then
(3.28) min{cρa23 ρ ∈ R0} = e
34a23 = c3a23 = h2 < e
12a23.
Consequently, we speak of an ε–23–relevant coalition T 23⊆D23 if
→
λ(T 23) = εa23,
that is,
v(T 23) = min{cρ
→
λ(T 23) ρ ∈ R0} = εmin{c
ρa23 ρ ∈ R0}
= λ2(T 23) = λ3(T 23) = h2ε < λ
1(T 23) .
Accordingly, if T 32⊆D23 satisfies
→
λ(T 32) = εa32, then
v(T 32) = min{cρ
→
λ(T 32) ρ ∈ R0} = εmin{c
ρa32 ρ ∈ R0}
= λ1(T 32) = λ3(T 32) = h3ε < λ
2(T 32)
justifies calling T 32 an ε–32–relevant coalition. A comprehensive discussion
of this example will be presented in a separate paper.
◦ ˜˜˜˜˜˜ ◦
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4 The Separating Pre–Coalitions
Within this section we draw some first conclusions based on the Inheritance
Theorem. In particular we show that, with some conditions it suffices to
focus on the relevant vectors of type a⊙ and a⊕ as described in Theorem 3.5.
The following definition is just an extension of our previous conventions.
Definition 4.1. 1. Let x be a pre–imputation and let y ∈ Rrt. We shall
say that x dominates y via a ∈ Ae if
(4.1) xa ≤ v(a) = 1, and xτ > yτ for all τ with aτ > 0 .
We write x doma y to indicate domination.
2. For any nonnegative measurable function ϑ let
(4.2) mτ := ess infDτ (τ ∈ T) and m := (m1, . . . , mrt) .
We shall then (somewhat sloppily) refer to m as the vector of essential
minima or the minima vector of ϑ.
Lemma 4.2. Let x be a pre–imputation and let ϑ be a (nonnegative) mea-
surable function. Let m denote the vector of essential minima of ϑ. If, for
some a ∈ Ae we have x domam, then there is ε0 > 0 such that for all ε with
0 < ε < ε0 there is an ε–relevant coalition T
ε = T εa such that
(4.3) ϑx domT εa ϑ
holds true.
Proof: As xτ > mτ we can, for all τ ∈ T with aτ > 0, choose a coalition
S
τ ∈Dτ such that
•
ϑ < xτ holds true on S
τ . Therefore, we can choose ε0 > 0
such that for all 0 < ε < ε0 there exists T
ετ ⊆ Sτ such that λ(T ετ) = εaτ
holds true for all τ with aτ > 0. That is, for T
ε := ∪τ∈T,aτ>0 T
ετ we have
→
λ(T ε) = εa which implies
(4.4) ϑx(T ε) = εxa = ε = εv(a) = v(T ε) .
As T τ ⊆ Sτ we conclude
(4.5)
•
ϑ <
•
ϑx on T ε ,
hence ϑx domT ε ϑ,
q.e.d.
Definition 4.3. A vector (pre–coalition) a ∈ Ae is said to be separating if
there is τ¯ ∈ T1 × . . .×Tr such that
aτ¯ρ > 0 (ρ ∈ R) and aτ = 0 whenever τ 6= τρ .
The relevant vectors that are separating are of the shape described in either
item 1 or item 2 of Theorem 3.5. Denote
(4.6) As := {a ∈ Ae a is separating }.
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Thus, for a ∈ As, an ε–a–coalition T εa has an intersection with exactly one
Dτ in every Cρ. The corresponding vector valued measure is either
→
λ(T εa) = εa = ε(0, . . . , 0, 1, 0 . . . , 0, 1, 0, , . . . , , . . . , 0, 1, 0 . . . , 0) .
or
→
λ(T εa) = εa = ε(0, . . . , 0, 1, 0 . . . , 0, , . . . , . . . , 0, 1, 0 . . . , 0,
1−
∑
ρ∈R\{r} hτρ
hτr
, . . . , 0) ,
(assuming that r is the index distinguished according to item 2 of Theorem
3.5). Define
(4.7) H := {x ∈ J xa ≥ v(a) = 1, (a ∈ As)} .
Then H is the set of pre–imputations which cannot be dominated via some
separating pre–coalition. Accordingly define
(4.8) H := {ϑx x ∈H} .
Note that C(v) ⊆H and C(v) ⊆ H as eT
ρ
∈H holds true for all ρ ∈ R.
Now it turns out that any imputation with minima vector outside of H can
be dominated by (itself and) the core.
Theorem 4.4. Let ϑ be a imputation and letm = (mτ )τ∈T denote its vector
of minima.
1. If, for some a ∈ As we have ma < 1 = v(a), then ϑ is dominated by
itself and the core. Hence, ϑ cannot be an element of a vNM–Stable
Set.
2. In particular, if F ⊆ J is a set of pre–imputations inducing a vNM–
Stable set F = {ϑx x ∈ F }, then F ⊆ H.
Proof: Let τ¯ ∈ T1 × . . .× Tr be the sequence defining a via Theorem 3.5.
In what follows we write hτ :=
∑
ρ∈R hτρ .
1
st
STEP :
As ma < v(a) we have
ma < eT
ρ
a (ρ ∈ R) .
As a is separating this means∑
ρ∈R
mτρaτρ < aτσ (σ ∈ R) ,
and consequently
(4.9) mτρ < 1 (ρ ∈ R) .
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Therefore, we can choose 0 < ε1 such that for all ε < ε1 there is an ε–relevant
coalition T εa (intersecting each Cρ just in Dτρ) such that ϑ(•) < 1 on T εa
and hence, for all 0 < δ ≤ 1,
(4.10) ϑ(•) < (1− δ)ϑ(•) + δ
∑
ρ∈R λ
ρ
r
(•) on T εa .
Note that T εa has measure λ(T εa) = εhτ =
∑
ρ∈R hτρ .
2
nd
STEP : Now choose 0 < ε2 < ε1 and 0 < δ2 such that, for all ε < ε2 and
0 < δ < δ2, one can find T
εa satisfying (4.10) and in addition
(4.11) (1− δ)ma+ (1− δ)δ +
δ
r
hτ < v(a) = 1
as well as
(4.12)
•
ϑ(•) < mτρ +
δ
hτ
on T εa ∩Dτρ = T εaτρ (ρ ∈ R) .
That is
(4.13)
•
ϑ(•) < mτρ +
δ
hτ
•
λτρ(•) on T εaτρ (ρ ∈ R) .
Hence we come up with
ϑ(T εa) < εma+
δλ(T εa)
hτ
= εma+ δε
(4.14)
3
rd
STEP : Combining we find, for all ε < ε2 and 0 < δ < δ2:[
(1− δ)ϑ+ δ
∑
ρ∈R λ
ρ
r
]
(T εa)
= (1− δ)ϑ (T εa) + δ
∑
ρ∈R λ
ρ
r
(T εa)
< (1− δ)εma + (1− δ)δε+
δ
r
εhτ by (4.14)
= ε
(
(1− δ)ma+ (1− δ)δ +
δ
r
hτ
)
< εv(a) = v(εa) = v(T εa) . by (4.11)
(4.15)
Now, the inequalities (4.10) and (4.15) show that the imputation
(1− δ)ϑ+ δ
∑
ρ∈R λ
ρ
r
indeed dominates ϑ via T εa,
q.e.d.
The previous theorem shows that imputations outside ofH can be dominated
by means of the core and themselves. The following exhibits a certain type
of candidate which together with the core may dominate imputations via
separating vectors.
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Theorem 4.5. Let â be a separating vector (pre–coalition) (with arbitrary
coordinate σ for the coordinate 6= 1 in the second item if applicable). Let
τ̂ be the sequence specified by Theorem 3.5. Let x¯ be an imputation with
coordinates xτ = hτ > 0 along τ̂ . Let ϑ be an imputation with minima
vector m. If
(4.16)
∑
ρ∈R
mτ̂ρ <
∑
ρ∈R
hτ̂ρ ,
Then, for sufficiently small ε > 0, there exists an ε–relevant coalition T ε =
T
εâ and a convex combination x̂ of the eT
ρ
(ρ ∈ R) and x¯ such that
(4.17) ϑx̂ domT ε ϑ
holds true.
Proof:
Assume w.l.g. that r minimizes the quotients
mτ̂ρ
hτ̂ρ
, i.e.,
mτ̂r
hτ̂r
≤
mτ̂ρ
hτ̂ρ
, or
(4.18)
mτ̂r
hτ̂r
hτ̂ρ ≤ mτ̂ρ (ρ ∈ R) .
Define α :=
mτ̂r
hτ̂r
< 1. Now because of
1−
∑
ρ∈R
mτ̂ρ > 1−
∑
ρ∈R
hτ̂ρ
it follows that (
1−
∑
ρ∈R mτ̂ρ
)
+mτ̂r(
1−
∑
ρ∈R hτ̂ρ
)
+ hτ̂r
>
mτ̂r
hτ̂r
= α ,
or, equivalently
1−
∑
ρ∈R\{r}mτ̂ρ
1−
∑
ρ∈R\{r} hτ̂ρ
> α ,
1−
∑
ρ∈R\{r}
mτ̂ρ > α
1− ∑
ρ∈R\{r}
hτ̂ρ

which is
(4.19) 1− α >
∑
ρ∈R\{r}
(
mτ̂ρ − αhτ̂ρ .
)
Because of (4.18) the terms under sum in (4.19) are all nonnegative. There-
fore, (4.19) permits to choose positive reals α1, . . . , αr such that
(4.20) 1− α > 1− αr >
∑
ρ∈R\{r}
(
mτ̂ρ − αhτ̂ρ .
)
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(4.21) αρ > mτ̂ρ − αrhτ̂ρ (ρ ∈ R \ {r}) ,
and
(4.22) 1− αr =
∑
ρ∈R\{r}
αρ
holds true. In other words, the αρ are positive convex coefficients as
(4.23)
∑
ρ∈R
αρ = 1 .
Also, we have
(4.24) αr > α =
mτ̂r
hτ̂r
.
Now consider the vector
(4.25) x̂ :=
∑
ρ∈R\{r}
αρe
T
ρ
+ αrx¯ .
Then clearly for ρ ∈ R \ {r} we have
(4.26) x̂τ̂ρ = αρ + αrhτ̂ρ > mτ̂ρ
(in view of (4.21)), and for ρ = r
(4.27) x̂τ̂r = αrhτ̂r > αhτ̂r = mτ̂r
(in view of (4.24)). Next
(4.28) x̂â =
∑
ρ∈R\{r}
αρe
T
ρ
â+ αrx¯â =
∑
ρ∈R
αr = 1 = v(â).
The last 3 equations and inequalities show
x̂ domâm
Now by Lemma 4.2 there exists ε0 > 0 such that for all ε with 0 < ε < ε0
there is an ε–relevant coalition T ε = T εa such that
(4.29) ϑx̂ domT εa⊕ ϑ
holds true.
q.e.d.
Theorem 4.6. 1. C(v) dominates J \H.
2. If H ⊆ C(v) then H = C(v) is externally stable, hence the unique
vNM–Stable Set.
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Proof:
1
st
STEP : Let ϑ /∈ H be an imputation with minima vector m. Ifm ∈H ,
then m is a pre–imputation, hence ϑ = ϑm ∈ H. Hence we can assume
m /∈H . We show that ϑ is dominated by the core.
Now, for some a ∈ As we have ma < v(a) = 1. Let τ¯ be the sequence
specifying a according to 3.5. Then (as the coordinates of a are at least 1
by (3.20)) ∑
ρ∈R
mτρ ≤
∑
ρ∈R
mτρaτρ =ma < 1 .
Now choose 0 < ε, (δρ)ρ∈R sufficiently small and an ε–a–relevant coalition
T
εa such that
•
ϑ(•) < mτρ + δρ on T
εa ∩Dρ := T εaρ (ρ ∈ R)
as well as ∑
ρ∈R
mτρ +
∑
ρ∈R
δρ < 1
holds true. Furthermore, choose 0 < δ such that(∑
ρ∈R
mτρ +
∑
ρ∈R
δρ
)
+ δ = 1
and put
αρ := mτρ + δρ +
δ
r
(ρ ∈ R)
such
∑
ρ∈R αρ = 1. Then we have
•
ϑ(•) < mτρ + δρ < mτρ + δρ +
δ
r
= αρ on T
εa ∩Dρ = T εaρ (ρ ∈ R) ,
that is
•
ϑ(•) <
∑
ρ∈R
αρe
T ρ(•) on T εa
and ∑
ρ∈R
αρλ
ρ(T εaρ) =
∑
ρ∈R
αρε(aτρ) =
∑
ρ∈R
αρε = ε = v(εa) = v(T
εa) .
This way it is seen that ϑ is dominated by the core.
2
nd
STEP :
The second part follows immediately as C(v) ⊆ H is generally true. There-
fore, we have in this case C(v) = H. that is, the core is externally stable,
hence the unique vNM–Stable set. q.e.d.
⋆ Section 4: The Separating Pre–Coalitions ⋆ 23
Example 4.7 (The EHMS Example). We consider the case of two inter-
mediate values similarly to Section 2, Example 2.1. Thus we have
(4.30)
•
λ0 = h2 1D2 + h3 1D3 + 1D4 .
We focus on h and λ satisfying
(4.31) h1 = 0, h2, h3 < 1, h4 = 1, h2 + h3 ≥ 1, λ1 + λ3 ≤ 1 .
Note that the last condition is equivalent to either λ2 ≥ λ3 or λ4 ≥ λ1.
Einy, Holzman, Monderer and Shitovitz ([2], Example 4.3.) consider
the special case that h1 = 0, h4 = 1, h2 = h3 =
1
2
and λ1 =
1
2
, λ3 =
1
4
.
Now, under the condition (4.31) , it turns out that the core is stable. Indeed,
we have
A =
{
a ∈ Rt min {a1 + a2, a3 + a4, h2a2 + h3a3 + a4} ≥ 1,
}
A short computation (using a standard procedure for the generation of ex-
tremals of a compact and convex set) yields the relevant vectors:
Ae =
{
(1, 0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1, 0), (1, 0,
1
h3
, 0)
}
.
Hence, all relevant vectors are separating, we have As = Ae. Now,
(4.32)
H =
{
x ∈ J x1 + x4 ≥ 1, x2 + x4 ≥ 1, x2 + x3 ≥ 1, x1 +
x3
h3
≥ 1
}
.
By λ1 + λ3 ≤ 1 the extremals of H turn out to be
{(1, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 1)} =
{
e12, e34
}
⊆ C(v).
Indeed, this can either be verified by running though the standard procedure
as above or slightly faster as follows.
Suppose x is an extremal in H . If
(4.33) x1 + x3 < 1
Then, adding the first 3 inequalities listed in (4.32) we obtain (x1 + x3) +
2(x2 + x4) ≥ 3, hence
(4.34) x2 + x4 > 1 .
Hence at least one of the equations xτ = 0 has to be involved in the deter-
mination of x.
Now, x4 = 0 would imply x1 ≥ 1 (from the first in (4.32)), hence not compat-
ible with (4.33). Similarly, x2 = 0 would imply x1 ≥ 1 and x3 = 0 together
with the last one in (4.32) would imply x1 ≥ 1 as well.
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Finally, if x1 = 0 would be the case, then
(4.35) 1 =
∑
τ∈T
xτ = λ2x2+λ3x3+λ4x4 ≥ λ3(x2+x3)+λ4x4 ≥ λ3+λ4 = 1 .
Now, if λ3 > λ2 then there is an immediate contradiction.
If, on the other hand, λ3 = λ2 then (4.35) shows that x2+x3 = 1 and x4 = 1
(as no strict inequality can occur). Then, together with x1 = 0, there are
only 3 independent equations determining x. Hence there must be a further
equation xτ = 0 determining x which, in view of the above cannot happen.
Hence, any extremal ofH satisfies in addition x1+x3 ≥ 1. Adding this to the
inequalities of H , we observe, that all the inequalities of C(v) are satisfied,
i.e., C(v) ⊆ H . Therefore, by Theorem 4.6 the core C(v) is a vNM–Stable
Set for v.
A slight generalization of the argument provided by Einy et al. [2] for the
case presented in (4.31). runs as follows.
Let η be an imputation and let m denote the vector of minima.
If m2 +m4 < 1 is true, then, for δ :=
1
2
(1 − (m2 +m4)) we can find ε > 0
and coalitions T τ ⊆Dτ (τ = 2, 4) such that both are of measure ε and
(4.36)
•
η < m2 + δ on T
2
,
•
η < m4 + δ on T
4
.
(in other words, T 24 := T 2 ∪ T 4 is ε − 24–relevant as λ3(T ) > ε). Then
clearly the imputation ϑ := (m2 + δ)λ
1 + (m4 + δ)λ
2 ∈ C dominates η via
T
24. Hence, if η is not dominated by the core, then necessarily m2 +m4 ≥ 1
holds true. Analogously we consider ε − 14–relevant and ε − 23–relevant
coalitions.
Hence, whenever η is not dominated by the core, the essential minima derived
satisfy the inequalities
(4.37) m1 +m4 ≥ 1
(4.38) m2 +m4 ≥ 1
(4.39) m2 +m3 ≥ 1 .
Adding up suitable “multiples” of these inequalities we obtain
λ1(m1 +m4) + λ3(m2 +m3) + [1− (λ1 + λ3)] (m2 +m4) ≥ 1.
which after some reshuﬄing and using λ1 + λ2 = λ3 + λ4 = 1 turns out to
be
(4.40)
4∑
τ=1
λτmτ ≥ 1 .
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Now, as η is an imputation, hence has integral not exceeding 1, we obtain
(4.41)
4∑
τ=1
λτmτ ≤ 1,
owing to the definition of the mτ .
Now, none of the inequalities involved can be a strict one, otherwise (4.41)
and (4.40) would yield a contradiction. Hence all inequalities are equations.
Then, from the first three it follows that m1 = m2 and m3 = m4 holds
true. This shows that η ≥ m11C1 +m31C2 with m1 + m3 = 1 from (4.40)
which is an equation as well. But as η is an imputation, we must have
η = m11C1 + m31C2, hence η ∈ C. Therefore, imputations not dominated
by the core are elements of the core, that is the core is (the only) vNM–
Stable Set. Of course, this procedure is just another approach to showing
that H = C(v).
◦ ˜˜˜˜˜˜ ◦
The following generalizes the EHMS Example, however the assumptions are
slightly different. As a prerequisite we mention a simple
Lemma 4.8. Let x ∈ Rrt+ be such that
(4.42) xτ1 + . . .+ xτr ≥ 1 (τ ∈ T
1 × . . .× Tr)
and
(4.43)
∑
τ∈T
λtxt ≤ 1 .
Then x = eT
ρ
for some ρ ∈ R.
Theorem 4.9. Let h > 0 and assume that there is exactly one sequence
τ¯ ∈ T1 × . . .× Tr such that
hτ1 + . . .+ hτr < 1
while
hτ1 + . . .+ hτr ≥ 1
holds true for all other sequences τ ∈ T1× . . .×Tr. Then C(v) is the unique
vNM–Stable Set.
Proof: 1stSTEP : Among the vectors a ∈ As we find all vectors
a⊙ = (. . . , 1, . . . , 1, . . . , . . . , 1, . . .)
with coordinates 1 along any sequence τ 6= τ¯ . There are also vectors of the
shape
a⊕ = (. . . , 1, . . . ,
1−
∑
ρ∈R\σ hτρ
hτσ
, . . . , 1, . . .) (σ ∈ R)
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with non vanishing coordinates along the sequence τ¯ . Accordingly, for x ∈H
we have inequalities
(4.44) xτ1 + . . .+ xτr (τ 6= τ¯ )
(4.45) xτ1 + . . .+ xτσ(
1−
∑
ρ∈R\σ hτρ
hτσ
) + . . . xτr ≥ 1 (σ ∈ R) ,
together with the equation
(4.46)
∑
τ∈T
λtxt = 1
characterizing pre–imputations.
We wish to prove that
(4.47) xτ1 + . . .+ xτr ≥ 1
holds also true, that is, the missing inequality of type (4.44) for τ¯ is present
as well. The result will then follow using the lemma.
2
nd
STEP :
Now, if we add up all the inequalities (4.44), we obtain rt − 1 on the right
side as there are rt sequences τ and τ¯ is excluded.
Next, on the left side, the variable xτ1(τ1 6= τ 1) appears r
(t−1) times, as
xτ2 , . . . , xτr can be chosen freely. On the other hand, the variable xτ1 appears
r
(t−1) − 1 times only, as the sequence xτ2, . . . , xτr must be avoided. Thus,
After adding all inequalities (4.44) and grouping the left side appropriately,
we obtain
(r(t−1) − 1)(xτ1 + . . .+ xτr)
+(r(t−1))(xτ2 + . . .+ xτr)
+ . . .+
+(r(t−1))(xτ ′2 + . . .+ xτ ′r) ≥ r
t − 1
(4.48)
with r − 1 terms on the left side apart from the first one. Note that
(4.49) (r(t−1) − 1) + (r − 1)r(t−1) = rt − 1 .
Thus, if one of the inequalities on the left side yields less than 1 in summation,
then another one must exceed 1.
3
rd
STEP : Consider now an extremal point x¯ of H . Assume that (4.47) is
violated, hence we have
(4.50) xτ1 + . . .+ xτr < 1 .
then at least one of the terms in (4.48) has to exceed 1. Hence, in order
to generate an extremal point of H , there has to be at least one equation
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xt = 0 involved in the equations selected among the inequalities for x¯. Let
us assume that xτ̂1 = 0 holds true with τ̂1 ∈ T
1.
4
th
STEP : Now, if τ̂1 6= τ 1, then in (4.44) all inequalities
(4.51) xτ2 + . . .+ xτr ≥ 1 .
for any sequence xτ2 , . . . , xτr appear as they can be chosen freely. If, on the
other hand, τ̂1 = τ 1, then consider the first equation (for σ = 1) in (4.45).
As xτ1 = 0, this equation reads indeed
(4.52) xτ2 + . . .+ xτr ≥ 1 .
Therefore, again all inequalities for any sequence xτ2 , . . . , xτr appear. Clearly,∑
ρ∈R\1
λtxt ≤ 1,
hence by the lemma x¯ restricted to coordinates in T2× . . .×Tr is one of the
eT
ρ
for ρ = 2, . . . , r. Then necessarily, x¯ has to be zero on all coordinates in
T1.
5
th
STEP : The above reasoning was done under the assumption that (4.45)
is violated. However, if (4.45) holds true, then again by the lemma we have
that x¯ is one of the eT
ρ
for ρ = 1, . . . , r. We conclude, that all the extremals
ofH are necessarily those of the pre–core, that isH ⊆ C(v) and H ⊆ C(v).
Then the present theorem follows from Theorem 4.6,
q.e.d.
Note that the EHMS–example 4.7 and Theorem 4.9 rely on sightly different
assumptions, as in the example we have h1 = 0. The uniqueness of the
minimizing sequence is however the same in both cases. There is one extremal
point of the shape a⊕ missing and hence we need another device to show that
all inequalities xτ1 + xτ2 ≥ 1 appear. This is the requirement towards the
density regarding λ1, λ3 as specified in (4.31).
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